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IMPROPER COMMANDEERING 
Josh Blackman*  
ABSTRACT 
New York v. United States, Printz v. United States, and Murphy v. NCAA each involved federal 
laws that told a state to do, or not do something.  And, in each case, the Supreme Court found that the federal 
laws were unconstitutional because they violated the so-called “anticommandeering” doctrine.  However, the Court 
did not hold that any of these laws violated the Tenth Amendment, standing by itself.  Rather, in each case, the 
federal laws were unconstitutional because they exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.  Most recently, 
Murphy acknowledged the issue, but ultimately tiptoed around the doctrine of enumerated powers.  
 
Soon enough, the Supreme Court can restore doctrinal clarity in the percolating litigation over sanctuary cities.  To 
date, several courts have held that 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) is unconstitutional on its face.  This law requires states 
and their subdivisions to share information about unlawful aliens in their custody.  Or more precisely, states cannot 
enact laws that prevent their subdivisions from sharing that information with the federal government.  
 
Regrettably, these courts have based their rulings solely on the Tenth Amendment, without discussing the scope of 
Congress’s enumerated powers.  Section 1373(a) is arguably a “necessary” means to carry into execution 
Congress’s powers to establish a uniform system of naturalization laws.  However, it cannot be “proper” for 
Congress to accomplish that end by instructing states how to manage their law enforcement agencies.  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court should provide this textual explanation for why Section 1373(a) violates the 
anticommandeering doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Pop quiz! 
 
Which of the following federal laws did the Supreme Court find to violate 
the Tenth Amendment? 
 
A. The “Take Title” provision in New York v. United States 
B. The background-check mandate in Printz v. United States 
C. The prohibition on state gambling laws in Murphy v. NCAA 
D. All of the above 
E. None of the above  
 
The correct answer is E, but you will be forgiven for thinking it was D.  
Judges, attorneys, law students, and even law professors routinely make this 
common mistake.  A federal law can no more violate the Tenth Amendment 
than a state law can violate the Supremacy Clause.  Rather, both clauses 
“simply provide[ ] ‘a rule of decision.’”1  
The Tenth Amendment tells us that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”2  This clause, added two 
years after the ratification of the Constitution, contains three premises.  First, 
we ask if a power is delegated to Congress.  For example, is that power 
enumerated in Section 8 of Article I, in Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or elsewhere?  If the answer is yes, then the federal law is a 
proper exercise of federal power.  In addition, by virtue of the Supremacy 
 
 1 See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479 (2018) (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015)). 
 2     U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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Clause, courts can “not give effect to [a] state law[ ] that conflict[s] with [this] 
federal law[ ].”3   
Second, if the answer is no, we ask if the Constitution prohibits the state 
from exercising that power.  For example, are the states prohibited from 
taking such an action because of a limitation in Section 10 of Article I, in 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or elsewhere?  If the answer to the 
second question is no, then we move onto the third premise: Congress lacks 
this power, and the Constitution does not bar the states from exercising this 
power.  Therefore, the states—and only the states—can exercise that power.  
Justice O’Connor articulated a similar logic in New York v. United States: “If 
a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment 
expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is 
an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is 
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.”4  Both 
questions center around whether Congress or the states have the power to 
do, or not do something.  “It is in this sense,” Justice O’Connor observed, 
“that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is retained which 
has not been surrendered.’”5  
Now that we’ve had a chance to articulate first principles, let’s review our 
pop quiz.  New York v. United States,6 Printz v. United States,7 and Murphy v. NCAA8 
each involved federal laws that told a state to do, or not do something.  And, 
in each case, the Court found that the federal laws were unconstitutional 
because they violated the so-called “anti-commandeering” doctrine.  
However, the Court did not hold that any of these laws violated the Tenth 
Amendment, standing by itself.  Rather, in each case, the federal laws were 
unconstitutional because they exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated 
powers.  
First, in New York, Congress lacked the power to force the states to enact 
legislation and take title of radioactive waste.  Second, in Printz, Congress 
lacked the power to mandate that state officials must perform firearm 
background checks.  Third, in Murphy, Congress lacked the power to tell 
states not to authorize gambling.  Generally, Congress can regulate each of 
these areas—radioactive waste, firearms, and gambling—through its powers 
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  However, in each 
 
 3 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824)). 
 4 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
 5 Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).  
 6  New York, 505 U.S. at 156. 
 7  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 8  Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).  
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case, Congress ran afoul of the anticommandeering doctrine because these 
laws were not “proper” exercises of federal power.  New York made this point 
implicitly.  Printz,9 as well as National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”) 
v. Sebelius,10 made the point explicitly.  Most recently, Murphy acknowledged 
the issue,11 but ultimately tiptoed around the doctrine of enumerated powers.  
Soon enough, the Supreme Court can restore doctrinal clarity in the 
percolating litigation over sanctuary cities.  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) provides that 
a “State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any 
way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving 
from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the 
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”12  
The Trump Administration relied on Section 1373 to withhold federal 
funding from so-called “sanctuary cities.”13  In response, those jurisdictions 
have challenged those executive actions.  To date, several district courts have 
held that Section 1373 is unconstitutional on its face.14  Regrettably, these 
courts have based their rulings solely on the Tenth Amendment, without 
discussing the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court should provide a textual explanation for why Section 1373 
violates the anticommandeering doctrine. 
Part I traces the history of the anticommandeering doctrine from the First 
Bank of the United States to McCulloch v. Maryland to Prigg v. Pennsylvania to 
New York v. United States to Printz v. United States to NFIB v. Sebelius to Murphy v. 
NCAA.  Part II concludes that Section 1373(a) is arguably a “necessary” 
means to carry into execution Congress’s powers to establish a uniform 
system of immigration laws.  However, it cannot be “proper” for Congress 
to accomplish that end by instructing states how to manage their law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
 9  Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24. 
 10   NFIB. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 11  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475–76.  
 12  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012). 
 13  Immigration 101: What Is a Sanctuary City?, AMERICA’S VOICE (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://americasvoice.org/blog/what-is-a-sanctuary-city/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2018).  
 14 See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Accordingly, 
the Court holds that 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b), insofar as it applies to states and localities, is facially 
unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.”); City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“In sum, Section 1373 impermissibly 
directs the functioning of local government in contravention of Tenth Amendment principles 
. . . .”); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 331 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“Section 1373 
violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution . . . .”).  
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I.  COMMANDEERING IS NOT A “PROPER” EXERCISE OF FEDERAL 
POWER 
In recent years, the anticommandeering doctrine has “come to be 
associated primarily with the Tenth Amendment.”15  This association is not 
accurate.  Rather, the anti-commandeering doctrine is best understood to 
reflect the limited scope of Congress’s enumerated powers: laws that 
command states to do, or not do something, may be “necessary” to 
accomplish certain legitimate ends, but cannot be deemed “proper” exercises 
of federal power.  To understand New York v. United States and Printz v. United 
States, we have to revisit the basis of the First Bank of the United States, 
McCulloch v. Maryland, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania.  In addition, NFIB v. Sebelius, 
and more recently, Murphy v. NCAA shed some, but not enough light on the 
foundation of commandeering.  The Supreme Court has failed to precisely 
articulate the textual basis of this principle.  Part I takes up this mantle. 
A.  The First Bank of the United States and McCulloch v. Maryland 
Following the ratification of the Constitution, our young Republic faced 
serious financial problems.  In 1790, Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary of 
the Treasury proposed, the creation of a national bank to address these 
issues.16  The bank would operate branches throughout the United States, 
which could establish credit, accept deposits, and loan money to the new 
national government.17  The power to incorporate a bank cannot be found 
in the first seventeen clauses of Article I, Section 8.  The bill to establish the 
bank does not directly collect taxes.  So that power is out.  Nor does the bill 
borrow money or regulate commerce.  All of the other express powers are 
likewise out.  Only the eighteenth clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
could possibly support the power to incorporate the bank.  It provides: 
Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”18 
 
 
 15 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is 
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 623 (2010). 
 16  Historical Highlights: The First Bank of the United States, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN [hereinafter 
Historical Insights], https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1700s/1791_First_Bank/ (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
 17  Id.  
 18  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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 The debate in Congress and in the Executive Branch centered around 
an important question: in order to execute the powers to collect taxes, borrow 
money, or regulate commerce, is it “necessary and proper” for Congress to 
charter a bank?  Representative James Madison objected to the bank’s 
constitutionality in a speech to Congress.  He argued that the power to 
incorporate a bank was not incidental to any of the enumerated powers.  
Therefore, this “great and important power” needed to be enumerated in 
the Constitution.19  In addition, Madison contended that it was not necessary 
to incorporate a bank in order to collect taxes, borrow money, or regulate 
commerce.20  He concluded that Congress lacked the power to incorporate 
the bank.21  
Despite Madison’s opposition, Congress approved the Bank.22  President 
Washington asked members of his cabinet for their opinions on the Bank’s 
constitutionality.  Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State, took an even 
more stringent view of “necessary” than did Madison.  Jefferson contended 
that when “the constitution restrained [Congress] to the necessary means” of 
executing its powers, Congress’s authority was limited to “those means 
without which the grant of the power would be nugatory.”23  Because its goals 
could be accomplished in other ways, it was not “necessary” to charter the 
bank.  
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who first proposed the 
idea of the national bank, strongly rejected Jefferson’s strict reading of 
“necessary.”  Instead he defined “necessary” as “needful, requisite, 
incidental, useful, or conducive.”24  In other words, if it is “useful” for 
Congress to charter a bank in order to collect taxes or borrow money, then 
Congress has the power to do so.  
Hamilton rejected any test of constitutionality that rested on the “degree 
in which a measure is necessary,” or “the more or less of necessity or utility” 
of a measure.25  However, he did not go so far as to say that Congress had 
the discretion to adopt any means that, in its sole judgment, would be 
 
 19 James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/ 
founders/documents/a1_8_18s9.html. 
 20  Id.  
 21  Id.  
 22  Historical Highlights, supra note 16.  
 23 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to George Washington, U.S. President, (Feb. 
15, 1791), available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-07-02-0207. 
 24 Hamilton’s Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, in THE FEDERALIST: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 659 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
1898). 
 25  Id. at 659–60.  
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convenient to carry into execution other enumerated powers.  Instead, 
Hamilton offered the following test: “The relation between the measure and 
the end; between the nature of the mean employed toward the execution of 
a power, and the object of that power must be the criterion of 
constitutionality.”26  Today, we would describe this approach as “means-
ends” scrutiny.  President Washington may have agreed with Hamilton’s 
opinion on the Bank’s constitutionality.  Or he may have agreed with 
Jefferson that, because the decision was a close one, he should defer to 
Congress.  In either event, in 1791, President Washington signed the bill into 
law, and chartered the First Bank of the United States.27  It would remain in 
business for two decades. 
In 1816, Congress chartered a second bank of the United States.28  
President James Madison signed the bill into law.  Did he change his opinion 
from two decades earlier about the meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause?  In private correspondence, Madison defended the consistency of his 
approach.  He contended that it was proper to defer to the judgment of 
several Congresses on the question of whether a bank was truly necessary to 
execute its powers, especially given what he said was the bank’s “almost 
necessity.”29 
However, soon the bank became very unpopular.30  In 1818, the 
Maryland General Assembly imposed a tax on the branch of the Bank of the 
United States in Baltimore.31  The bank’s cashier, James William McCulloch, 
refused to pay the tax.  Maryland sued McCulloch to recover the money.32  
The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled for the state.33  McCulloch then 
appealed the case to the Supreme Court.  He argued that the state could not 
tax the federal institution.34  However, before the Court could decide if the 
state tax was constitutional, it had to first decide if Congress had the power 
to charter the federal bank.  The debate from two decades earlier between 
Jefferson and Madison on one side, and Hamilton on the other, would now 
 
 26  Id. at 660. 
 27  Historical Highlights, supra note 16.  
 28  Letter from Andrew Jackson, U.S. President, to John Coffee (Feb. 19, 1832), available at 
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/treasures_of_congress/text/page9_text.html. 
 29 Letter from James Madison, U.S. President, to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 185 (William C. Rives & Philip R. Fendall 
eds., 1867). 
 30  Letter from Andrew Jackson, U.S. President, to John Coffee (Feb. 19, 1832), available at 
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/treasures_of_congress/text/page9_text.html. 
 31  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317–18 (1819).  
 32  Id. at 318–19.  
 33  Id. at 437.  
 34  Id. at 318–19. 
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be resolved by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland.  
Chief Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion.  He rejected 
Maryland’s very narrow reading of “necessary.”  Though Marshall did not 
cite Hamilton, the Chief Justice copied several portions of the Treasury 
Secretary’s opinion on the bank almost verbatim.  Hamilton defined 
“necessary” as “needful,” “requisite,” “useful,” and “conducive.”35  Marshall 
used the same four adjectives, but added the word “Convenient” at several 
junctures in his opinion36—a term that Hamilton did not use as a synonym 
for “necessary.”  Marshall can be read as saying that Congress could do 
whatever is “convenient” in order to execute its other enumerated powers.  
Indeed, Marshall described the creation of a bank as “a convenient, a 
useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal operations” 
and “an appropriate mode of executing the powers of government.”37  He 
rejected the notion that the federal bank must be an “absolute physical 
necessity.”38  Marshall puts forward the following test, which, to this day, is 
relied upon by the Supreme Court to determine the scope of Congress’s 
implied powers: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of 
the constitution, are constitutional.”39 
McCulloch held that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress a 
power sufficient to incorporate the bank.  As a result, Maryland could not 
tax the federal bank, because “the power to tax involves the power to 
destroy.”40  Marshall rejected the objection that the Constitution did not 
specify a power to create a bank, on the ground that such specificity “would 
partake of the prolixity of a legal code.”41  Instead, he declared, “we must 
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”42  He added: our 
Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to 
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”43  In other words, to avoid 
soon growing outdated, the Constitution speaks in more general terms. 
 
 
 35  Hamilton’s Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, supra note 24, at 659. 
 36  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 333, 354, 365, 367, 371, 409, 413. 
 37  Id. at 422.  
 38  Id. at 413.  
 39  Id. at 421. 
 40  Id. at 431.  
 41  Id. at 407.  
 42  Id.  
 43  Id. at 415.  
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Much of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision focused on the construction of 
the phrase “necessary.”  Though, the Court offered a separate test to 
determine if a law is also “proper.”  Specifically, the Constitution “does not 
license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ 
beyond those specifically enumerated.”44  Chief Justice Marshall did not 
provide much guidance on how this test should be applied—that is, when 
does a mere incidental power become a “great substantive and independent 
power.”  The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts would revisit this question 
nearly two centuries later.  Several decades later, the Court would expand 
on the scope of “necessary” in the context of the Fugitive Slave Act. 
B.  The Fugitive Slave Act and Prigg v. Pennsylvania  
In 1793, Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act, which authorized slave 
catchers to travel across state lines and arrest runaway slaves.45  This federal 
law was very unpopular. Several northern states that opposed slavery, 
including Pennsylvania, enacted so-called “Personal Liberty Law.”46  These 
statutes prevented a person’s removal from the state without a full judicial 
proceeding—including a jury trial—to determine whether or not that person 
was in fact a fugitive slave. These state laws conflicted with the federal act, 
that included only the most minimal procedural protections.  
Congress can only enact laws pursuant to one of its delegated powers. 
What provision of the Constitution gave Congress the power to enact the 
Fugitive Slave Act?  One possible candidate is the Fugitive Slave Clause, 
which appears in Article IV, Section 2.  It provides: “No Person held to 
Service or Labour in one State . . . escaping into another . . . shall be 
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be 
due.”47  The text does not actually give Congress any new power to enact 
that Fugitive Slave Act.  Rather, the Clause merely governs the relations 
between the states.  
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
Congress lacked the enumerated powers to enact the Fugitive Slave Act.48  
Justice Story wrote the majority opinion.  He held that the Fugitive Slave Act 
was constitutional because it was intended to prevent free states from 
“intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the rights of the owners of 
 
 44 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411). 
 45  Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (amended 1850) (repealed 1864). 
 46  Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 550 (1842). 
 47  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.   
 48  Prigg, 41 U.S. at 625–26. 
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slaves.”49  He doubted that the Union could have even been formed if the 
Fugitive Slave Clause had not been added to the Constitution.  
But what about the argument that Article IV, Section 2 does not grant 
Congress the power to enforce the Clause?  Justice Story responded that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause provides the necessary authority.  He wrote: 
“The end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary 
implication, that the means to accomplish it are given also; or, in other words, 
that the power flows as a necessary means to accomplish the end.”50  This 
construction by Justice Story in Prigg extends well beyond Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch.  It remains one of the most expansive 
readings of the Necessary and Proper Clause ever adopted by the Supreme 
Court.  In sum, because Justice Story found that that the Fugitive Slave Act 
was made “in pursuance of” the Fugitive Slave Clause, and in conjunction 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, that act was “supreme” and 
preempted the Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law.51   Prigg’s conviction was 
therefore reversed.52   
Justice Story also maintained that the states cannot be “compelled to 
enforce” the Fugitive Slave Act.53  He added, “it might well be deemed an 
unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist, that the 
states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the 
national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by the 
constitution.”54  Rather, it is for the national government to carry into effect 
its own policies.55  Specifically, in the context of the Fugitive Slave Act, 
“where a claim is made by the owner, out of possession, for the delivery of a 
slave, it must be made, if at all, against some other person.”56  In other words, 
the Constitution authorizes Congress to mandate action by private parties, 
pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Clause.  However, that provision does not 
allow Congress to commandeer state executive-branch officials.  
Justice Story also opined on another aspect of the anticommandeering 
doctrine: The Fugitive Slave Act required state judges to enforce the law.57   
In an oft-forgotten portion of the opinion, Story found that state courts could 
 
 49  Id. at 611. 
 50  Id. at 619. 
 51  Id. at 561. 
 52  Id. at 626. 
 53  Id. at 615.  
 54  Id. at 615–16.  
 55  Id.  
 56  Id. at 616. 
 57 See Josh Blackman, State Judicial Sovereignty, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2033, 2056–57. 
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be exempted from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act if state legislatures 
deprived them of jurisdiction to hear such cases.58  After all, courts without 
jurisdiction can do nothing.  Justice Story found the Fugitive Slave Act “to 
be clearly constitutional, in all its leading provisions, and, indeed, with the 
exception of that part which confers authority upon state magistrates.”59  He continued:  
[With respect to the] authority so conferred upon state magistrates, while a 
difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still, on the point, in different 
states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under it, none is 
entertained by this court, that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise 
that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.60   
In the normal course, state courts of general jurisdiction were obligated to 
enforce federal law.61  
However, the states were under no obligation to confer such jurisdiction 
on their own courts.  Justice Story does not even entertain the notion that 
Congress could confer jurisdiction on a state court to entertain certain claims.  
Nor could Congress compel a state legislature to confer such jurisdiction on 
their state courts to carry out the Fugitive Slave Act.  In this regard, Prigg 
foreshadowed the question presented in New York v. United States.62  Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Haywood v. Drown noted this facet of Prigg: state courts 
could not “be compelled to enforce” the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.63  Justice 
Stevens’s majority opinion in Haywood, alas, disregarded Prigg.64 
In the aftermath of Prigg, many states deprived their state judges of subject 
matter jurisdiction concerning the Fugitive Slave Act.65  As a result, federal 
agents were unable to enforce the law without the benefit of state courts. 
Congress obviated this problem with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.66  This 
far-more draconian law established federal commissioners in every county 
 
 58  Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622.  
 59 Id. (emphasis added). 
 60 Id. (emphasis added). 
 61 Cf. Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery Constitutionalism, National Law Enforcement, Federalism, 
and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399, 1410 (2004) (“In the years after Prigg a number of 
northern judges simply refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, even though under Prigg 
they were legally free to do so, and in Story’s eyes had a constitutional or even moral obligation to 
do so.”). 
 62  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).   
 63 Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 764 n.8 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Prigg, 41 U.S. at 
615).  
 64 Blackman, supra note 57, at 2059. 
 65 Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1411 (“A number of states followed Story’s ‘hint’—if that is what it can 
be called—and prohibited their judges from hearing cases under the federal Fugitive Slaw Law of 
1793.”). 
 66  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). 
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who could decide and enforce fugitive slave cases.67  As a result, federal 
agents would no longer have to rely on state courts.  This approach, in a way, 
promoted federal aims while respecting federalism.68 
What was the basis for Justice Story’s ruling?  Prigg teaches that Congress 
cannot mandate, or commandeer, state executive- and legislative-branch 
officials to take certain actions.  But why are courts different?  The answer 
may be derived from Article VI of the Constitution.  Pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause, the “judges in every state shall be bound” by the 
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof.”69  In contrast, pursuant to the Oaths Clause, “Members 
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers . . . of 
the several States” are “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution.”70  State judges are bound by the former clause.  State 
executive, legislative, and judicial officers are bound by the latter clause.  The 
Constitution is silent about the precise distinction between being bound by the 
Constitution and being bound to support the Constitution.  But there is a textual 
difference between the two provisions—a textual difference that is reinforced 
by Justice Story’s Prigg dichotomy between the executive and legislative, and 
judicial branches.  
To this day, McCulloch remains the definitive account of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.   Prigg, perhaps due to its odious subject matter, is seldom 
cited in discussions about commandeering.71  Over a century later, 
commandeering cases decided by the Rehnquist and Roberts Court would 
harken back to Chief Justice Marshall, but not to Justice Story.  
C.  Commandeering State Legislatures to Enact Legislation and New York v. United 
States   
In 1985, only three states had facilities that disposed of low-level 
radioactive waste.72  In response, Congress enacted a law that created 
incentives for states to provide for waste generated within their border.73  The 
 
 67 Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1413. 
 68  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 961–62 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As a general 
matter, Congress has followed the sound policy of authorizing federal agencies and federal agents 
to administer federal programs.”). 
 69  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 70  Id.  
 71 Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1400 (“Oddly, none of the opinions in [Printz] mentioned the first 
Supreme Court case to deal with these issues, Prigg v. Pennsylvania.”). 
 72  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 151 (1992). 
 73  Id.  
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most severe incentive was the so-called “Take Title” provision.74  If a state 
could not provide a disposal facility, the state must take title, or ownership, 
of waste generated by private parties within the state.75  Furthermore, the 
state would be liable for all damages that results from the waste.76  New York 
challenged the constitutionality of this law.77  The state acknowledged that 
the federal government could regulate the interstate waste market, but 
Congress could not force the state to take ownership of private radioactive 
waste.78  
Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion.  She agreed with New 
York: “Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of 
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.’”79  In other words, Congress lacked the power to force 
the state legislature to enact new laws that assume title and liability for the 
radioactive waste.  Congress had other means to encourage the states to take 
title of radioactive waste.  For example, it could provide money to the states 
with strings attached, like in South Dakota v. Dole.80  Or Congress could 
preempt waste disposal and impose a uniform federal standard nationwide.  
But it could not force the state legislatures to enact such laws itself.  (Justice 
Story’s opinion in Prigg supported this holding, but Justice O’Connor did not 
mention it.)  Justice O’Connor recognized the importance of federalism in 
our system of government.  “The Constitution divides authority between 
federal and state governments,” she wrote, “for the protection of 
individuals.”81  
The commandeering cases, including New York, are often described as 
Tenth Amendment cases.  However, Justice O’Connor said the Tenth 
Amendment was not relevant to her analysis, not directly at least.  “The 
Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress,” she wrote, 
“but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, 
which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology.”82  
Let’s revisit this concept using the three premises identified in the 
Introduction.  First, we ask if a power is delegated to Congress?  For example, 
can Congress require New York to take title of the radioactive waste pursuant 
 
 74  Id. at 153–54. 
 75  Id.  
 76  Id.  
 77  Id. at 154.  
 78  Id. at 159–60.  
 79  Id. at 161 (alteration in original). 
 80  Id. at 167. 
 81  Id. at 181.  
 82  Id. at 156–57. 
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to its powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause 
clauses?  If the answer is yes, then Congress can exercise that power. 
However, the New York Court answered that question no.  It is certainly 
necessary—that is “conducive”—for Congress to require states to deal with 
the nationwide problem of radioactive waste disposal.  However, it is not a 
“proper” exercise of federal power to require the state legislature to enact 
laws that take title of the waste. 
Second, we ask if the Constitution prohibits the state from taking that 
action.  The Constitution of 1789 listed several prohibitions in Article I, 
Section 10.83  For example, states cannot enact bills of attainder or ex post 
facto laws.84  Subsequently, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments placed additional restrictions on the states.  However, the 
Constitution says nothing about how New York can or can’t deal with 
radioactive waste.  
Therefore, third, the decision of how to handle the waste is reserved to 
the state.  Congress lacks the power to tell the state how to exercise that 
power.  The Tenth Amendment, standing by itself, adds nothing to the 
Court’s analysis.85  If Congress lacks the power to force states to pass a statute, 
then the states retain the power to deal, or not deal, with the waste.  
New York implicitly stands for an important proposition: while the “Take 
Title” provision may be a “necessary” means to regulate the interstate waste 
market, requiring a state to legislate is an intrusion into state sovereignty, and 
is therefore not a “proper” exercise of federal power.  That this 
anticommandeering principle rests on the meaning of “proper” in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause: would not become explicit until Printz v. United 
States.86  This 1997 decision considered whether Congress could 
commandeer state executive branch officials.87  
 
 
 
 83 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018) (“The Constitution limits state sovereignty in 
several ways.  It directly prohibits the States from exercising some attributes of sovereignty.” (citing 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10)).  
 84  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 85 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 n.13 (1997) (“This argument also falsely presumes that 
the Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism.  Our 
system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions [. . .] and not only 
those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly.”). 
 86  Id. at 898. 
 87  Id.  
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D.  Commandeering State Executive-Branch Officials and Printz v. United States  
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act imposed a wide range of 
new gun control laws.88  One provision required the attorney general to 
establish a new national database.89  This system would allow federal firearm 
dealers to instantly check the background of prospective handgun 
purchasers.90  Developing that electronic system would take some time. 
During the interim, the federal law  “command[ed] state and local law 
enforcement officers”—CLEOs—“to conduct background checks on 
prospective handgun purchasers.”91  The law was challenged by several 
sheriffs, including Jay Printz of Ravali County, Montana, and Richard Mack 
of Graham County, Arizona.92  The CLEOs argued that the federal 
government could not force them to perform background checks, and delay 
people in their communities from purchasing firearms.93  
The Court split 5-4 in favor of the Sheriffs.  Justice Scalia wrote the 
majority opinion.  He extended New York’s rubric, and found that Congress 
also lacked the power to commandeer state executive-branch officials.94  The 
majority disagreed with Justice Stevens’s dissent, which—according to the 
majority—contended that the Brady Act was valid “because the Tenth 
Amendment imposes no limitations on the exercise of delegated powers.”95   
The dissent also stated that the Necessary and Proper Clause was an 
“affirmative delegation of power in Article I” that “provides ample authority 
for the congressional enactment.”96  
Justice Scalia responded that the Necessary and Proper Clause was “the 
last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.”97  He 
stated explicitly what Justice O’Connor had implied in New York v. United 
States: to ascertain if a federal law falls within the scope of Congress’s powers 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, courts must separately ask whether 
a law is both “necessary” and “proper.”  Justice Scalia stated the rule 
succinctly: “When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce 
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty . . . it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for 
 
 88  Id. at 902. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92  Id. at 904. 
 93  Id. at 905. 
 94  Id. at 935. 
 95  Id. at 923.  
 96  Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 97  Id. at 923 (majority opinion). 
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carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of 
The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be 
treated as such.’”98  
The Brady Act provision very well may have been a “necessary”—that is 
conducive—means to regulate the interstate firearms market.  However, 
forcing Sheriffs to perform background checks was not a “proper” exercise 
of federal power.  Such a law violated the principle of state sovereignty 
reflected in the Tenth Amendment and other structural provisions of our 
Constitution.  The Tenth Amendment, standing by itself, did not provide the 
rule of decision.  Rather, the Tenth Amendment merely informed the 
Necessary and Proper Clause analysis.  
The Printz Court explained that its decision five years earlier in New York 
v. United States reflected the same principle: federal laws that commanded 
states to regulate interstate commerce may be deemed necessary, but are not 
a proper exercise of federal power.99  In both Printz and New York, the federal 
laws were not proper because they intruded on the principles of state 
sovereignty.  Therefore, these laws were beyond the scope of Congress’s 
express and implied enumerated powers.  Justice Scalia would return to this 
theme in his concurrence in Bond v. United States.100  He explained that “[n]o 
law that flattens the principle of state sovereignty, whether or not ‘necessary,’ 
can be said to be ‘proper.’”101  This proper framework turned on a due respect 
for state sovereignty. 
Against this backdrop Justice Scalia cited several  early statutes “enacted 
by the first Congresses [that] required state courts” to take action concerning 
matters of naturalization.102  The first Naturalization Act of 1790, for 
example, provided that an alien “may be admitted to become a citizen 
thereof, on application to any common law Court of record, in any one of 
the states.”103  The law further provided that the state court “shall administer” 
the oath, accept “proof” that “he is a person of good character,” and the 
 
 98 Id. at 923–24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (emphasis added)). 
 99 Id. at 924 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“[E]ven where Congress 
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks 
the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. . . . [T]he Commerce 
Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not 
authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”)). 
 100 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2101 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 101  Id.  
 102 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905–06. 
 103 United States Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). 
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“Clerk of such Court shall record such application.”104  The provision with 
the mandatory “shall,” Scalia suggested, imposed an affirmative obligation 
on the state judges.105  
A subsequent Naturalization Act passed in 1798 directed the “clerk, or 
other recording officer of the [state] court before whom a declaration has 
been, or shall be made, by any alien, of his intention to become a citizen of 
the United States, to certify and transmit to the office of the Secretary of State 
of the United States.”106  Justice Scalia explains that intrusions on state 
courts’ jurisdiction were limited to judicial matters: “the Constitution was 
originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to 
enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters 
appropriate for the judicial power.”107 
Paradoxically, Justice Scalia does not cite Prigg in Printz.108  Prigg expressly 
held that Congress could compel state courts of competent jurisdiction to 
enforce federal laws.109  Printz sub silentio reaffirmed Justice Story’s dichotomy.  
That is, Congress can commandeer state courts, but not state executive or 
legislative branch officials.  And textually, this rule can be derived from the 
text of “the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, [which] announced that ‘the 
Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.’”110  Justice Scalia explained that 
judges, unlike legislatures or executives, “applied the law of other sovereigns 
all the time.”111   In “so-called ‘transitory’ causes of action . . . laws which 
operated elsewhere created obligations in justice that courts of the forum 
State would enforce.”112  This principle is also implicit in the Full Faith and 
 
 104 See id. § 1 (emphasis added). 
 105  Cf. Nora Rotter Tillman & Seth Barrett Tillman, A Fragment on Shall and May, 50 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 453, 454 (2008) (“For example, legal discussions frequently focus on the alleged distinction 
between the use of (the mandatory) shall and (the permissive) may in the Constitution of 1787.  But 
this distinction may very well be a victim of presentism.”). 
 106 Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 567. 
 107  Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (second emphasis added).   
 108 Finkelman, supra note 61, at 1409–10 (“Oddly, Justice Scalia did not cite Prigg to bolster his 
contention that the law at issue in Printz was unconstitutional, even though he could have mustered 
the intellectual support of Justice Story.  Perhaps Justice Scalia did not do so because he would have 
been citing a case that otherwise supported slavery and was indeed, next to Dred Scott, the most 
important judicial support for slavery in our constitutional jurisprudence.”). 
 109 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625–26 (1842). 
 110 Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (emphasis added).  
 111  Id.   
 112 Id. (citing McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 247–249 (1843) (“And it also appears from the 
authorities which have been cited, that in a transitory action of trespass, it is only necessary to lay a 
venue for a place of trial, and that such venue is good without stating where the trespass was in fact 
committed, with a scilicet of the county in which the action is brought.”)). 
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Credit Clause, which “generally required such enforcement with respect to 
obligations arising in other States.”113  Thus, it is “understandable why courts 
should have been viewed distinctively in this regard.”114 
In dissent, Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed with the “suggestion that 
. . . the reference to judges in the Supremacy Clause . . . implied expressio unius 
. . . that the Framers . . . did not intend to permit the enlistment of other state 
officials.”115  Following his retirement, Justice Stevens proposed a 
constitutional amendment to rebut the expressio unius implication of the 
Supremacy Clause, and “to eliminate the rule” in Printz.116  As amended, 
Article VI would now read as follows, with the alterations emphasized:  
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
judges and other public officials in every state shall be bound thereby, anything 
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.117    
Stevens explained that by “[a]dding just four words—‘and other public 
officials’—immediately after the word ‘Judges’ in the Supremacy Clause 
would, under the Court’s reasoning, expressly confirm the power of Congress 
to impose mandatory duties on public officials in every state.”118  Justice 
Stevens’s proposed amendment reaffirms the textual distinction that Justice 
Scalia drew in Printz, and Justice Story recognized in Prigg.  
The distinction between “necessary” and “proper” makes its next 
appearance in the Affordable Care Act case, NFIB v. Sebelius. 
E.  Commandeering the People and NFIB v. Sebelius 
Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius provided 
the most authoritative, and significant application of the proper test.  He 
concluded that the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate [to purchase 
health insurance] cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms.”119  Unlike past 
exercises of implied power that were upheld, Chief Justice Roberts observed 
that the mandate’s “authority” is “in no way . . . ‘narrow in scope.’”120  Nor 
 
 113  Id.   
 114  Id.  
 115  Id. at 969 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 116 JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE 
CONSTITUTION 29 (2014). 
 117  Id. at 29–31. 
 118 Id.  
 119 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 560 (2012).  
 120 Id. (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 148 (2010)). 
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was the individual mandate merely “‘incidental’ to the exercise of the 
commerce power.”121  Rather, the individual mandate “work[ed] a 
substantial expansion of federal authority.”122  Why?  Because under “such a 
conception” of federal power, “Congress could reach beyond the natural 
limit of its authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise 
would be outside of it.”123  In other words, Congress would be able to regulate 
people it otherwise could not regulate.  Such a law is unconstitutional, 
because—invoking Chief Justice Marshall’s framework from McCulloch—it 
“involve[s] the exercise of a[ ] ‘great substantive and independent power.’”124  
Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts observed, “[e]ven if the individual mandate 
is ‘necessary’ to the Act’s insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal 
power is not a ‘proper’ means for making those reforms effective.”125 
The joint opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito 
elaborated on this framework—somewhat.  They explained that a federal 
law is improper “not only when the congressional action directly violates the 
sovereignty of the States but also when it violates the background principle 
of enumerated (and hence limited) federal power.”126  For example, 
Congress’s efforts to regulate guns in school zones,127 and domestic 
violence,128 ran afoul of that “background principle.” 
The Chief Justice’s framework left much to be desired.  In dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg posed the critical questions left unanswered: “How is a judge to 
decide, when ruling on the constitutionality of a federal statute, whether 
Congress employed an ‘independent power,’ or merely a ‘derivative’ one?  
Whether the power used is ‘substantive,’ or just ‘incidental’?”129  At bottom, 
she observed, the lower courts are offered little guidance: “You will know it 
when you see it.”130  I don’t disagree with Justice Ginsburg’s admonitions.  
Yet, NFIB added a new layer to the anticommandeering doctrine.  New 
York held that Congress lacks the enumerated powers to compel state 
legislatures to enact legislation.131  Printz held that Congress lacks the 
 
 121 Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819)).  
 122 Id.   
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 561 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411).  
 125 Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
 126 Id. at 653 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 127 Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–63 (1995)).  
 128 Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–19 (2000)). 
 129 Id. at 621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in 
part).  
 130  Id.  
 131  See discussion supra Section I.C.  
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enumerated power to compel state executive branch officials to enforce 
federal legislation.132  And NFIB held that Congress lacks the enumerated 
power to compel the people to engage in commercial transactions.133  Such 
an authority would force the people to “bring themselves within the sphere 
of federal regulation.”134  That is, all Americans could be commandeered by 
the federal power—whether they entered the stream of commerce, or not.135  
In each of these three cases, the mandates may have been “necessary”—that 
is conducive—to implement a legitimate end.  However, the mandates on 
the legislatures, the executive branch, and the people themselves, were not 
proper exercises of federal power.  In particular, the Affordable Care Act’s 
individual mandate was not proper because of its unprecedented reach into 
private conduct.  The Tenth Amendment informs this inquiry, for it speaks 
of the powers “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”136  But 
the mandates at issue in New York, Printz, and NFIB do not violate the Tenth 
Amendment standing by itself.  The next case, Murphy v. NCAA, expanded 
the scope of New York v. United States. 
F.  Commandeering States Not to Enact Legislation and Murphy v. NCAA 
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) 
“generally makes it unlawful for a State to ‘authorize’ sports gambling 
schemes.”137  While the “Take Title” provision in New York commanded 
states to enact specific legislation, PASPA did just the opposite: it 
commanded states not to enact specific legislation.  New Jersey wanted “to 
legalize sports gambling at casinos and horseracing tracks.”138  However, 
doing so would have violated the federal law.  Therefore, the Garden State 
challenged the constitutionality of this provision of PASPA.  
In Murphy v. NCAA, six Justices held that the law ran afoul of the 
anticommandeering doctrine.139  Three Justices, in dissent, “assum[ed] 
arguendo” that the challenged part of PASPA was unconstitutional, but found 
that other provisions of the law should be severed.140  Two of the dissenters—
 
 132  See discussion supra Section I.D. 
 133  See discussion supra Section I.E.   
 134 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 560. 
 135 See generally Barnett, supra note 15 (discussing why the Supreme Court could find the Affordable 
Care Act unconstitutional).  
 136  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 137 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1468 (2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012)).  
 138 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1468. 
 139 Id. at 1475.  
 140 Id. at 1488–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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Justices Ginsburg and Breyer—joined the Printz dissent two decades earlier.  
Yet, they now accepted—or at least declined to reject—a doctrine that 
Justice Stevens concluded had no basis in the text or history of the 
Constitution.141  Justice Kagan joined Murphy without reservation.  
Justice Alito’s majority opinion conceded that “[t]he anticommandeering 
doctrine may sound arcane, but it is simply the expression of a fundamental 
structural decision incorporated into the Constitution.”142  He maintained 
that these principles “did not emerge in our cases until relatively recently, 
when Congress attempted in a few isolated instances to extend its authority 
in unprecedented ways.”143  (Justice Alito, like Justice Scalia before him, did not 
identify the application of the anticommandeering doctrine in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania.)  In several contexts, the Constitution “indirectly restricts the 
States by granting certain legislative powers to Congress, see Art. I, § 8.”144  
Under the Supremacy Clause, he continued, “when federal and state law 
conflict, federal law prevails and state law is preempted.”145  
Yet, the scope of this preemptive force is limited.  Why?  Though “sizable, 
[the legislative powers granted to Congress] are not unlimited.”146  Beyond 
the “certain enumerated powers” that the Constitution delegates to 
Congress, “all other legislative power is reserved for the States, as the Tenth 
Amendment confirms.”147  Here, the key word is confirms.  The Tenth 
Amendment does not allocate power between the federal government and 
the states.  Rather, the Tenth Amendment merely recognizes the structure 
that is implicit in the Constitution.  A law that runs afoul of this allocation 
does not violate the Tenth Amendment. 
Does Article I, Section 8 authorize Congress “to issue direct orders to the 
governments of the States”?148  Justice Alito answered no.149  Such a power 
is “conspicuously absent” from the Constitution.150  That power cannot be 
found in Commerce Clause.  Nor can it be found in “the last, best hope of 
those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”151  The Framers chose “to withhold from Congress the power to 
 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. at 1475 (majority opinion).  
 143 Id. at 1476 (emphasis added).  
 144 Id. 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. (emphasis added). 
 148  Id.  
 149  Id.  
 150  Id. 
 151  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997). 
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issue orders directly to the States,” which “retained ‘a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty.’”152  Justice Alito added, “[t]he anticommandeering 
doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit on congressional 
authority.”153  
Justice Alito identified three “significant” “reasons” to “explain[ ] why 
adherence to the anticommandeering principle is important.”154  First, he 
found that this doctrine “serves as ‘one of the Constitution’s structural 
protections of liberty.’”155  Second, he continued, “the anticommandeering 
rule promotes political accountability.”156  Third, he concluded, “the 
anticommandeering principle prevents Congress from shifting the costs of 
regulation to the States.”157 
Given this framework, PASPA “violates the anticommandeering rule” 
because it “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not 
do.”158  Through PASPA, Congress sought to put “state legislatures . . . 
under the direct control of Congress.”159  PASPA presumes that “federal 
officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the 
authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals.”160  
Justice Alito concluded, “[a] more direct affront to state sovereignty is not 
easy to imagine.”161 
The result in Murphy flows from New York and Printz.  Justice Alito’s 
majority opinion attempted to synthesize the doctrines from those cases. 
However, in the process, he erased the necessary-but-not-proper analysis.  
Indeed, the majority opinion failed to anchor its analysis in the text of the 
Constitution.  
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, concisely articulated this 
doctrine, like Justice Scalia did two decades earlier.  He found that Congress 
 
 152 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 98, at 245 (James 
Madison).  But cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (“To the Constitution of 
the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown.  There is but one place where it 
could have been used with propriety.  But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported 
with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established that Constitution.  They might have 
announced themselves ‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the United States: But serenely conscious of the 
fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.” (emphases omitted)). 
 153  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476. 
 154 Id. at 1477. 
 155 Id. (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 921). 
 156 Id.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. at 1478.  
 159 Id.  
 160 Id.  
 161 Id.  
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lacks the enumerated power to commandeer the states: PASPA “exceeds 
Congress’ Article I authority to the extent it prohibits New Jersey from 
‘authoriz[ing]’ or ‘licens[ing]’ sports gambling.”162  To reach this conclusion, 
Justice Thomas ruled out the two most common grants of authority in 
Article I, Section 8.  First, the Commerce Clause “does not authorize 
Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate 
commerce.”163  Second, “[t]he Necessary and Proper Clause does not give 
Congress this power either.”164  Here, Justice Thomas articulated the textual 
reason why commandeering is unconstitutional: “a law is not ‘proper’ if it 
‘subvert[s] basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.’”165  PASPA, 
which commandeers the states, “subverts those principles.”166  Justice 
Thomas got Printz exactly right.  The majority got it wrong.  
There is a downside to Justice Alito’s majority opinion: lower court judges 
will be able to disregard the text of the Constitution, with ease.  Instead, 
courts will—as they are wont to do—weigh the majority’s three principles as a 
balancing test to determine if a given law runs afoul of the 
anticommandeering doctrine.  Imagine the colloquy: Well, this law frustrates 
political accountability, but doesn’t shift that many costs to the state, and has only a 
minimal infringement on individual liberty, so the law passes muster.  This trend will 
mask the doctrinal underpinnings of New York and Printz: federal laws that are 
not “proper” exercises of federal power.  
More importantly, Murphy fails to shine any light on other types of 
improper federal laws that do not commandeer.  To date, the Supreme 
Court has only used this framework to declare unconstitutional laws that 
impose mandates on states or the people.  However, other laws that fall short 
of commandeering may still not be proper exercises of federal power.167  As 
a result, Murphy allows the lower courts to disregard the “proper” framework, 
and treat commandeering laws as an isolated subset of constitutional law that 
has no bearing on other elements of the scope of Congress’s powers.  This 
 
 162 Id. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012)). 
 163 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 
(1992)). 
 164 Id.  
 165 Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 65 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 166 Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997)). 
 167 See Brief for Cato Institute & Professors of Constitutional Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellee at 30, People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
852 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 14-4151 & 14-4165) (“Any construction of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause that upholds the ‘take’ regulation of the Utah prairie dog necessarily upholds a 
broad, unenumerated power to regulate the ecology of each individual state.  This regulation is 
both unnecessary and improper.”).  
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outcome is unfortunate.  Fortunately, Murphy’s omission can be remedied in 
a future case concerning sanctuary cities.  
II.  SECTION 1373(A) IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) provides that a “State, or local government entity or 
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or 
official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service [“INS”] information regarding the citizenship or 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”168  (The 
Department of Homeland Security now performs this role in the place of the 
defunct-INS.)  This law requires states and their subdivisions to share 
information about unlawful aliens in their custody.  Or more precisely, states 
cannot enact laws that prevent their subdivisions from sharing that 
information with the federal government.  
This two-decade-old law169 has taken on a new salience as part of the 
Trump Administration’s ongoing litigation concerning so-called “sanctuary 
cities.”170  Specifically, the federal government argues that this law requires 
the states to tell the federal government where and when a given alien will be 
released from custody.171  That way, Immigration and Customer 
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents can safely arrest and detain the alien.  However, 
as a threshold matter, this statute only applies to a specific category of 
information: “the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of 
any individual.”172  The law in no way requires the state to share information 
about an alien’s release date or location.  Therefore, the statute is largely 
unhelpful.  The federal government already knows an alien’s “citizenship or 
immigration status.”173  ICE seeks custody of that alien, precisely because it 
already has such information in its possession.  The statute is silent about the 
precise information the government needs—where and when the alien will 
be released.  Ultimately, Congress enacted a statute that fails to serve the 
present-day needs of the executive branch. 
 
 168  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012). 
 169 Section 1373 was signed into law on August 22, 1996.  Printz v. United States was argued on December 
3, 1996 and was decided six months later on June 27, 1997.  Query if Congress anticipated Printz 
when the immigration law was enacted. 
 170 See Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, Testing California’s ‘Sanctuary’ Laws, CATO INST. (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/testing-californias-sanctuary-laws (discussing 
the constitutional implications of two California sanctuary laws challenged by the Trump 
Administration).  
 171  Id. 
 172  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). 
 173  Id.  
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This Article, therefore, will not consider whether Section 1373 is 
unconstitutional as applied to the current sanctuary city litigation.  Rather, I 
will focus on the broader question: whether the law is unconstitutional on its 
face.  First, I will consider Section 1373 under Murphy’s approach.  Second, 
I will turn to Printz’s necessary-but-not proper rubric.  These analyses yield 
slightly different outcomes.  This distinction at one demonstrates the 
pliability of Justice Alito’s atextual commandeering analysis.  
A.  Section 1373 and Murphy 
Let’s start with the Murphy-three-step.  First, does shielding states from 
the enforcement of Section 1373 “protect[ ] . . . liberty”?174  The sanctuary 
cities would unquestionably contend that the federal law infringes the 
freedoms of immigrants in their communities.  The so-called “sanctuary” 
laws are enacted precisely to protect aliens from federal immigration 
enforcement—much like the personal liberal laws were enacted two 
centuries earlier to protect runaway slaves from the Fugitive Slave Act.175  
The federal government would counter that Section 1373 prevents states 
from harboring criminals who seek to evade federal law enforcement 
officials.  How can people be free, the argument goes, unless they are safe to 
live their lives?  This question brings to mind Abraham Lincoln’s famous 
parable about liberty: “The world has never had a good definition of the 
word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one.  
We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the 
same thing.”176 
 Does liberty protect the right of aliens in sanctuary city to avoid ICE 
agents?  Or does liberty ensure that criminal aliens in sanctuary cities are 
brought to justice to promote the general welfare?  
Moreover, unlike the regulation of radioactive waste or firearms—areas 
where states have plenary authority—the federal government has, under 
modern doctrine177 at least, exclusive jurisdiction over immigration.  New York 
 
 174 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
921 (1997)). 
 175  See discussion supra Section I.B.  
 176  President Abraham Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr. 18, 1864), in 7 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1863–1864, at 301–03 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 177  See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 419 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“In fact, the controversy surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts involved a debate over 
whether, under the Constitution, the States had exclusive authority to enact such immigration laws.”). 
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recognized that “‘the Constitution divides authority between federal and 
state governments for the protection of individuals.’”178  Did the Constitution 
settle this balance between federal and state power for the protection of 
liberty with respect to immigration?  The first factor invariably turns on 
difficult value judgments about which regime more effectively promotes 
liberty. 
Second, does Section 1373 “blur[ ]” political accountability?179  The 
states will argue yes: local officials will be forced to comply with unpopular 
immigration policies, even against the wishes of their constituents.  The 
federal government will counter that the federal government has plenary 
authority over immigration in all regards.  Therefore, local voters who are 
unhappy with immigration laws can seek a change at the federal level.  Here, 
the states have the stronger argument.  
Third, does Section 1373 “shift[ ] the costs of regulation to the States”?180  
The cost here is likely minimal.  States that already know a person’s 
immigration status can readily share that information with the federal 
government.  Unlike with handling of radioactive waste, or performing of 
firearm background checks, Section 1373’s cost is de minimis.  
At bottom, these three factors are somewhat inconclusive as applied to 
Section 1373.  Were I to weigh these concerns, the scale would tip towards 
unconstitutional.  But a credible argument can be made to the contrary.  Does 
that then mean the question is open under Murphy?  No.  Justice Alito’s 
formalistic test decisively resolves the issue.  Through Section 1373, Congress 
“unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”181  
Specifically, the sanctuary states may not enact laws that protect information 
about the immigration status of aliens in their jurisdiction.  Section 1373 
places “state legislatures . . . under the direct control of Congress.”182  This 
federal law imposes a “direct affront to state sovereignty.”183 
Yet, this holding is somewhat unsatisfying.  Why is this law such an 
“affront”?184  The answer can be found through a careful study of Article I, 
Section 8, and the allocation of powers between Congress and the states. 
 
 178 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).  
 179  Id.  
 180  Id.  
 181  Id. at 1478 (emphasis added). 
 182  Id.  
 183  Id.  
 184  See id.  
 
Mar. 2019] IMPROPER COMMANDEERING 985 
   
 
B.  Section 1373 Is Not a “Proper” Exercise of Federal Power 
All exercises of federal power must be supported by a delegation of 
authority from the Constitution.185  The regulations at issue in New York, 
Printz, and Murphy could be defended as exercises of Congress’s powers under 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The 
framework from these three cases, however, does not carry over to Section 
1373.  This federal regulation of sanctuary cities does not purport to regulate 
interstate commerce or intrastate economic activity.186  Rather, the law 
mandates disclosure of information concerning an alien’s immigration status.  
Section 1373 cannot be supported by Congress’s powers under the 
Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  
1.  Section 1373 Cannot Be Supported by Congress’s Power over Interstate or 
Foreign Commerce 
In New York, Printz, and Murphy, the Court did not question whether 
Congress could regulate interstate markets of radioactive waste, firearms, and 
gambling.187  For example, Congress could preempt state laws concerning 
these three fields, and use federal agents to enforce those laws.188  Nor did 
the Court in those cases doubt that Congress could regulate intrastate markets 
of radioactive waste, firearms, and gambling so long as those activities had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.189  This latter analysis, premised 
on the Necessary and Proper Clause framework from Wickard v. Filburn, 
 
 185  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 186  See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012). 
 187 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1992) (“Petitioners do not contend that 
Congress lacks the power to regulate the disposal of low level radioactive waste.  Space in 
radioactive waste disposal sites is frequently sold by residents of one State to residents of another.  
Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress’ 
authority under the Commerce Clause.”); cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“But even assuming the Commerce Clause allows Congress to prohibit intrastate sports gambling 
‘directly,’ it ‘does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate 
commerce.’” (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166)).  
 188 Cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481 (“In sum, regardless of the language sometimes used by Congress 
and this Court, every form of preemption is based on a federal law that regulates the conduct of 
private actors, not the States.  Once this is understood, it is clear that the PASPA provision 
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling is not a preemption provision because there is no 
way in which this provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors.”). 
 189 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Even if we construe 
Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that 
‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce, I question whether Congress can regulate the particular 
transactions at issue here.”). 
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serves as the basis for virtually all federal regulations: Congress can regulate 
intrastate economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.190  That is, Congress carries into execution its power to regulate 
interstate commerce by enacting laws that are necessary and proper to 
regulate intrastate economic activity. 
However, the challenged laws at issue in New York, Printz, and Murphy did 
not merely regulate interstate and intrastate markets for radioactive waste, 
firearms, and gambling.  Rather, the laws mandated states to regulate those 
areas.191  Under McCulloch, forcing states to take such actions is a necessary—
that is “conducive”—means to police these three areas.192  If the states take 
such action, then the federal government does not need to assert itself.  
However, such regulations were not a proper way to achieve legitimate ends.  
Stated simply, it is not proper for Congress to mandate states to regulate 
intrastate economic activity.193 
This analysis does not provide the rule of decision for Section 1373.  In 
United States v. Lopez, the Court held that Congress could not regulate 
noneconomic intrastate activity, even if that activity had a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.194  However, where intrastate “economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity 
will be sustained.”195  However narrow this test may seem, Gonzales v. Raich 
provided a capacious definition of “economics”: “the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities.”196  Section 1373 regulates a 
 
 190 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (“Congress may properly have considered that 
wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have 
a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased 
prices.”). 
 191 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (“The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for 
example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize 
Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”). 
 192  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819) (“[T]he power of punishment 
appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as 
incidental to his constitutional powers. . . . It is a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its 
beneficial exercise.”). 
 193 See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (“When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce 
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions 
we mentioned earlier, it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ 
and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be 
treated as such.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 98, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton))). 
 194 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
 195 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560). 
 196 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Economics, 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)). 
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single state sharing information.  This activity is non-economic and cannot 
be aggregated under Wickard. 
The Commerce Clause may be relevant in a different context.  Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 3 provides: Congress has the power to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”197  As understood in 1791, “commerce” was limited to some 
sort of “intercourse,” or perhaps “social interaction.”198  Under modern 
doctrine, the movement of people can constitute “commerce.”199  The 
federal government could potentially argue that Section 1373 is a necessary 
and proper means to regulate the movement of aliens between states, and to 
regulate aliens who travel from foreign nations into the states.  For example, 
Congress may not know the identity of an alien who journeys across a border 
into a sanctuary state.  Section 1373 would require the state to disclose to the 
federal government the immigration status of any new immigrants.  With this 
understanding, Congress could link Section 1373 to its power to regulate 
foreign commerce: receiving such information makes federal immigration 
schemes more efficient.  As a result, the mandate to provide the information 
would be a necessary, that is a conducive means to regulate foreign commerce.  
Ultimately, this argument fails for reasons discussed in the next part: even if 
these means are necessary, they are not proper exercises of federal power. 
2.  Section 1373 Cannot Be Supported by Congress’s Power over Naturalization 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 grants Congress the power “[t]o establish a 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”200  This provision offers the strongest basis 
to support the constitutionality of Section 1373.  Indeed, this Clause serves 
as the basis for modern immigration laws.  (Though, as an original matter, 
the phrase “naturalization” is best understood to refer to grants of 
citizenship; not a plenary power to regulate immigration.201)  Moreover, 
several Supreme Court decisions have suggested that Congress has an inherent 
power over foreign and domestic immigration.202  Even Justice Scalia—
 
 197  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 198 See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 101 n.3 (2001).  
 199 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–56 (1964). 
 200  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 201 See Ilya Somin, Does the Constitution Give the Federal Government Power Over Immigration?, CATO 
UNBOUND (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/09/12/ilya-somin/does-
constitution-give-federal-government-power-over-immigration. 
 202 See e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of 
international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential 
to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only 
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usually a stickler for the separation of powers—acquiesced to this doctrine.  
He admitted that “there was no need [for the Framers] to set forth control of 
immigration as one of the enumerated powers of Congress.”203  The notion 
of an unenumerated power over immigration stands in tension with our 
Constitution’s structural design.  It is a bedrock principle that the federal 
government only has those powers that are enumerated in the 
Constitution.204  
In any case, under modern doctrine, Congress has the power to regulate 
domestic immigration.205  And Congress can use this power to authorize 
federal officers to obtain the immigration status of aliens in all fifty states.  
Obtaining such information would—under modern doctrine—promote a 
“uniform Rule of Naturalization.”  Can Congress accomplish this goal by 
requiring states to share such information with the federal government?  This 
approach would certainly be a “necessary”—that is conducive—means to 
promote a uniform immigration scheme nationwide.  After all, the system 
would be frustrated if the government had information about aliens in 
cooperative states, but no information about aliens in sanctuary states.  
Under the Court’s case law stretching from McCulloch to the present, such a 
regulation would be a necessary means to carry into execution an enumerated 
power.  But is that approach also proper? 
To answer this question, let’s consider how Section 1373 operates in 
practice.  At the outset, someone in state government wants to share 
information with the federal government concerning a person’s “citizenship 
or immigration status.”206  Someone else, who ranks higher in state 
government, takes steps to “prohibit, or . . . restrict” the “sending” of such 
information.207  Generally, this sort of conflict is resolved internally: higher-
 
in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.  In the United States this power 
is vested in the national government, to which the constitution has committed the entire control of 
international relations, in peace as well as in war.” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)). 
 203 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 422 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)). 
 204 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“The Constitution creates a Federal Government 
of enumerated powers.”). 
 205 The basis of a federal power over domestic immigration law has largely been under-theorized, and 
ill-explained, by the Supreme Court.  See Ilya Somin, Immigration, Freedom, and the Constitution, 40 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017) (arguing that Congress does not have the power to regulate 
immigration); Josh Blackman, The Power to Exclude (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265780 (arguing that Congress does not have plenary power over 
immigration, but does have the power to deny entry of aliens).  But see John C. Eastman, The Power 
to Control Immigration Is a Core Aspect of Sovereignty, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9 (2017) (discussing 
that Congress does have the power to regulate immigration). 
 206  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012). 
 207  Id.  
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ranked state officials can instruct lower-ranked state officials how to act.  This 
dynamic can play out in a mundane fashion: a sheriff tells a deputy not to 
coordinate with ICE.  Or—as in the case of California—the state mandates 
that all entities within the state (such as cities, counties, prisons, etc.) must 
refuse to share the requisite information with the federal government.  In our 
Republic, states are free from federal control.  However, political 
subdivisions exist at the pleasure, and indeed absolute control, of the state.  
There is no internal equivalent of federalism for cities and states.  In the 
absence of Section 1373, there would be no question that states could issue 
such edicts. 
Section 1373 distorts that dynamic.  Congress has instructed higher-ups 
in the states how they must manage their subordinates.  That is, Congress 
has told sheriffs how to supervise their deputies, and has told state houses 
how to legislate over their subdivisions.  Moreover, local officials are 
forbidden by federal law from implementing sanctuary policies favored by 
their constituents.  Section 1373 is not a “proper” exercise of federal power:  
Congress cannot direct a state how to manage its workforce.  In other words, 
the federal government cannot dictate how a state controls its own law 
enforcement agencies, pursuant to its police powers.  Congress retains the 
authority to withhold federal subsidies from states that deviate from federal 
standards.  Congress cannot, however, intercede in such internal affairs.  For 
these reasons, Section 1373 cannot be a proper exercise of federal power. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 1373(a) is unconstitutional on its face.  The courts can reach that 
result through a rote application of Murphy v. NCAA.  Taking this approach, 
however, would pay insufficient attention to the constitutional foundation of 
the anticommandeering doctrine.  Specifically, Section 1373(a), though 
perhaps a “necessary” means to establish a uniform naturalization scheme, 
is not a “proper” means to accomplish that goal.  Are we merely quibbling 
over semantics?  No.  The distinction between these two outcomes transcends 
nomenclature.  
For generations, students of McCulloch assumed that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause was a blank check for federal power.  Congress could choose 
whatever means were convenient to carry into exaction one of its enumerated 
powers.  Following Wickard v. Filburn, which embraced the substantial effects 
test, even intrastate economic activity supported federal regulation.  In 
addition, this presumption was especially well-founded in the immigration 
context, where Congress has plenary, and perhaps even inherent power.  
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However, Printz and NFIB unsettled that presumption.  These cases 
reaffirmed the principle that laws must be both “necessary” and “proper” to 
“carry[ ] into Execution the foregoing Powers” in Article I, Section 8—
including the power to regulate interstate commerce and naturalization.208    
It is not enough that a law makes it convenient for Congress to do its job.  
Courts must also carefully scrutinize whether the law does so in an improper 
fashion.  That is, did Congress recognize the scope of its own authority, or 
did it intrude on the prerogatives of the states?  
Judges following Murphy may be tempted to hide behind the veneer of the 
Tenth Amendment—a provision that has no teeth.  This approach, alas, 
enables courts to sidestep a core aspect of the judicial role that many scholars 
thought was abandoned decades ago: the enforcement of the doctrine of 
enumerated powers.  Judges that declare Section 1373 unconstitutional 
should embrace their decisions for what they are: furthering the project of 
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to chisel away at the New Deal settlement.  
This enterprise does not entail overturning well-entrenched precedents like 
Wickard v. Filburn.  Rather, in the words of Randy Barnett, the Court has 
declared: this far, but no farther.209  Moreover, acknowledging the basis of their 
rulings would make it plain that other similar federal laws, that stop short of 
commandeering, are also in constitutional doubt.   
There is, for some judges at least, a silver lining to the Murphy approach.  
A decision halting Section 1373 will simply be a one-off: a way to reject 
federal intrusions on the states in the sanctuary city context, without 
imposing any collateral damage on other species of federal invasions.  Judges 
can rule against Section 1373—and the Trump Administration—and then 
continue to rubber-stamp all manner of federal laws that overstep proper 
bounds.  Many fair-weather federalists would find this pathway attractive as 
a stopgap measure while an undesirable President resides in the White 
House.210  However, full-time federalists—including those on the Supreme 
Court—should place the anticommandeering doctrine in its proper context, 
such that all improper laws now bear the constitutional bullseye they deserve.  
 
 208  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 209 See Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors 
Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1348 (2013) (“This gestalt can be summarized as ‘this far and 
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